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The Soviet Union's activity in the Caribbean Basin,
executed via its client-states of Cuba and Nicaragua, has
created a serious threat to U.S. security in the region.
This threat to U.S. security takes two forms. The first is
the reality of a heavily militarized Cuba posing a signifi-
cant anti-SLOC potential against Caribbean sea lanes in the
event of general war. Such a scenario would tie down NATO
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets in the Caribbean, detract-
ing from NATO's ability to wage the ASW campaign in more
critical areas such as the Central and North Atlantic. The
second threat is Nicaraguan and Cuban active support of
leftist insurgencies in the Basin. These efforts, at the
direction of the Soviet Union, pose, not a potential, but a
present-day and ongoing security concern for the United States.
This thesis briefly examines the historical context of
Soviet involvement in the region, and then proceeds to cata-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The increased Soviet presence in Central America, either
directly or through client-states, places in jeopardy what has
been viewed as one of the United States' longest standing vital
interests: prevention of any hostile power from establish-
ing a military foothold in this hemisphere. Past administra-
tions, as well as the present one, have chosen to accept Cuba
and her prodigious military capability as an incontestable
fait accompli. Soviet military presence, including regular
visits to Cuba by frontline Soviet naval and air assets , has
been an accepted fact for many years. What the present admin-
istration appears resolved to prevent is the extension of that
military foothold to other parts of the Caribbean Basin. Cole
Blasier's conclusion, that the region is "most distant and
strategically least important to the Soviets," vastly under-
estimates the Soviet leadership's capacity to recognize the
potential for hopelessly entangling the United States in a
series of no-win political and/or military situations; perhaps
more importantly, the region could present a serious military
threat to the United States in the event of a general war.
If the Sandinista Revolution of 1979 was a turning point
for Soviet aspirations in the region, the U.S. invasion
of the Leninist island-nation of Grenada (sinking under the
weight of a monstrous collection of conventional weapons from
the Soviet Union) was a turning point for the United States
,
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and its policy for the Caribbean. The Reagan administration
chose a totally appropriate response to the security threat
presented in the area by the Leninist murderers of Maurice
Bishop—military force.
In a joint operation with Caribbean Forces, a lightning-
like, and extremely effective operation, was conducted in
October 1983, which removed this repressive Leninist regime
from power. U.S. military forces demonstrated two basic
political realities to the world. First, when used with com-
mitment and determination, military force is a remarkably
effective extension of foreign policy. Secondly, the U.S.
was not about to abandon the Caribbean Basin as its rightful
sphere of influence, even at the risk of alienating U.S.
domestic and world opinion by the utilization of armed force.
In this region, the gravest threat to U.S. security, both
in peacetime and in a general war situation, is the presence
of a militarized Cuba. As the second-most militarily power-
ful country in the Caribbean, this Soviet client-state presents
grave and complex security problems for the United States.
The ability of Soviet naval and air assets to operate at
will from Cuban facilities makes the Cuban threat that
much more considerable. In peacetime, the Soviets have
a base from which to operate intelligence collection plat-
forms, in the form of: strategic reconnaissance aircraft
(Bear-D) , nuclear attack submarines (SSN) , and intelligence
collection ships (AGI) . In time of war, all of these assets
would already be in place to begin operations against" U.S.
forces, and maritime shipping in the Caribbean. In the case
of SSN's and SSGN's, the mission would go beyond reconnais-
sance, and quickly shift to that of anti-shipping operations.
The tremendous potential danger to the United States in this
present-day state of affairs, is best described in the Report
of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America :
The Soviets have already achieved a greater capa-
bility to interdict shipping than the Nazis had during
World War II, when 50 percent of U.S. supplies to
Europe were shipped from Gulf ports. German U-boats
then sank 260 merchant ships in just six months, de-
spite the fact that allied forces enjoyed many advan-
tages, including a two- to-one edge in submarines, and
the use of Cuba for resupply and basing operations.
Today this is reversed . [Underline mine.] The Soviets
now have a two-to-one edge overall in submarines , and
can operate and receive aircover from Cuba, a point
from which all 13 Caribbean sealanes passing through
four chokepoints are vulnerable to interdiction. . .
.
The Soviets ability to carry out a strategy of "stra-
tegic denial" is further enhanced by the presence near
Havana of the largest Soviet-managed electronic monitoring
complex outside the Soviet Union. [Ref. 1]
The second major threat to U.S. security interests is
the Soviet client-state of Nicaragua. Here, the threat is
not only actual, but more importantly, is a threat of
tremendously increased potential. The Sandinista regime
is the co-conspirator (with Cuba) in providing support for
leftist insurgents in El Salvador, and elsewhere in the
region. Additionally, Nicaragua provides the Soviet Union
with all of the requisites for becoming a second Cuba, i.e.
a Soviet military/ideological partner in the Caribbean Basin
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which, besides fueling leftist insurgencies in the region, can
provide a replenishment haven for Soviet naval and air assets.
Composed solely of Soviet equipment, the Nicaraguan mili-
tary is grossly over-sized for the security needs of a country
of its size. As a result, it poses a threat to peaceful neigh-
bors, and fuels a Central American arms race which serves the
interests of no one in this hemisphere. The Sandinista's
explanation for their over-sized military machine is that it
is a defense against any future U.S. military incursion into
that country. Unfortunately, the Sandinista's are hard-pressed
to find any objective observer willing to acquiesce to the
notion that the Nicaraguans could defend themselves against
a U.S. military onslaught, even if the Nicaraguan military
establishment were twice its present size. Therefore, the
Sandinista's military might serves no real purpose other than
to threaten its nonhostile Central American neighbors.
A large-scale U.S. military solution to Nicaragua and
its threatening war machine is unattractive for a number of
reasons. A solution utilizing U.S. military intervention would,
in all likelihood, be a costly affair if U.S. ground forces
were employed in numbers. The Sandinistas are aware of this,
as are the Soviets. What would be far less costly, would be
the employment of either land-based, or carrier-based, U.S.
tactical airstrikes, to remove large segments of the Nicara-
guan military capability. This is a fact which is not lost
upon the Soviets and their Nicaraguan colleagues, and one
11
which probably has been a primary motivation in not providing
Soviet tactical aircraft to the Sandinistas as the Soviets
had promised earlier. The Reagan administration has repeated
that if Soviet tactical jet aircraft were to be sent to Nica-
ragua, a U.S. "response" would soon follow. The form that
response would take has been sufficiently vague to prevent
delivery, thus far.
This work will attempt to describe the present and poten-
tial threat posed to U.S. security interests by a grossly
over-militarized Cuba, and a Nicaraguan area, rapidly following
suit--with both countries supporting and fomenting insurgency
in Central America, and offering the capability of providing
basing facilities for the U.S.S.R.'s naval and air assets.
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOVIET RELATIONS
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA
A. GENERAL REVIEW
Although the history of the- Soviet Union's involvement
in Central America is not long, neither is it an overnight
phenomenon. Let us now turn to that historical perspective.
The interest and influence of the Soviet Union in Central
America began a little over 20 years ago. At the outset,
the Bolshevik regime seemed like a natural ally to the anti-
imperialist government of Mexico. Indeed, Mexico was one
of the first countries to grant diplomatic recognition to
the newly created Leninist government. However, geographi-
cal remoteness, and fear of U.S. hegemony in the region,
restrained the Soviets for many years—even precluding
establishment of diplomatic ties. (See Table I.) With the
exception of Mexico, this general trend remained true until
the 1960's.
Due to alleged subversive activities of local Communist
Parties, even friendly Mexico broke diplomatic relations
with the U.S.S.R. in 1930, followed by Uruguay in 1935.
Throughout Latin America, this ostracism would linger for
many years. After World War II, several governments, includ-
ing those of Chile and Columbia, severed ties with the
Soviets for the same reason as Mexico and Uruguay: alleged
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Although the Soviets claimed for years that their lack
of success in establishing government-to-government ties
with Latin American countries was due to U.S. interference,
there is little evidence to support this claim. A stronger
case could be made that, economically, the Soviets had rela-
tively little if anything to offer those countries in contrast
with private U.S. business interests, which offered much in
the way of investment.
In 1960, the U.S.S.R. maintained diplomatic relations with
only three countries in Latin America: Cuba, Brazil, and Argen-
tina. After the success of the Cuban Revolution, this situation
changed dramatically--not only with Latin America, but with
Central America as well. By the mid-19 70' s, nearly all of
the major South American and Central American Caribbean Basin
countries had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,
usually accompanied by substantial diplomatic presences, and
expanded commercial and cultural exchanges. Soviet trade
with the region grew tenfold between 1970 and 1977 [Ref . 3]
.
Ideologically, primary attention was given to Asia and
Africa in the post-Stalin reassessment of opportunities in
the Third World. In the 1950' s, Khurshchev's formulation of
a "zone of peace" in the Third World did not include Latin
America. There had been considerable debate among Soviet
scholars in the 1960's and 1970' s over the question of whether
or not Latin America should even be included as the Third
World. Such a "theoretical construct leads to a mechanical
15
transfer of the experience of national liberation wars,
and revolutions of the Afro-Asian countries to Latin American
conditions." [Ref. 4]
This debate among Soviet scholars has all but ceased.
Latin America, and specifically Central America and the
Caribbean, are now of primary importance to the Soviets.
Today, a far more representative statement from the Soviet
scholarly community would be Sergio Mikoyan's now famous
comment upon Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution (in Latin -
skaia America in 19 80) , which declared that the revolution
was an event of colossal international importance—one of
those events that demands reexamination of established con-
cepts. Much of the ambiguity found in Soviet writing about
Central America in the 1960's and 1970 's is no longer pre-
sent, having been replaced by general optimism.
Previous Soviet perceptions and practical considerations
were at the root of Moscow's earliest attitudes toward the
southern areas of this hemisphere. The Soviet Union had
lacked the resources and means of employment to support an
active strategy in an area so remote from the reaches of
the Bear. Moscow believed, and rightly so, that the United
States considered Latin America to be under its guardian-
ship, and therefore would not tolerate leftist regimes, or
any substantial Soviet influence. Going back as far as the
Spanish/American War of 1898, U.S. propensity for military
intervention in the region was an historical data point not
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lost on the Soviets. Had any doubts lingered in the minds
of the Kremlin leadership, they surely were dispelled by the
1954 U.S. intervention against the Soviet-supported Arbenz
regime in Guatemala, which resulted in the overthrow of that
regime. Leftist defeats in the Dominicaa Republic in 196 5,
and in Chile in 1973, were additional causes for Soviet
timidity.
This understandable pessimism was counterbalanced by the
success of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Castro's victory, and his
ability to defy the United States, was considered a clear
sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere. As a
result, the tone of Soviet speeches changed markedly. In
March 1966, at the 23d Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) , Brezhnev made mention of the courage-
ous liberation struggle in Latin America, and stated that
"today in every country in that continent, the people are
waging a struggle against U.S. imperialism and its accom-
plices [and are being led by] the working class and the
Communist Parties." [Ref. 5]
B. CUBA: THE GREAT BREAKTHROUGH
The increased scope of Soviet activities in the Caribbean
and Central America dates from May 1960, when the U.S.S.R.
formalized diplomatic relations with Cuba. Castro had suc-
ceeded in fulfilling a long-held Soviet dream, i.e., estab-
lishment of a revolutionary state in an area of perceived U.S
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preeminence. No one on either side of the iron curtain ever
could have imagined the far-reaching impact of that rela-
tionship in the following two decades . As one Soviet writer
put it:
The Cuban revolution was a shattering blow to
the theory of "geographic fatalism" that for a long
time had determined the policy of most of the Latin
American countries. According to the theory, the
territorial proximity of the Latin American states
to the USA doomed them to permanent dependence,
and to following in Washington's wake. Cuba's
experience has demonstrated that a revolutionary
people can shake off imperialism, and with the
support of the socialist community, successfully
withstand intervention, economic embargoes, achieve
economic and political sovereignty, and pursue an
independent foreign policy. [Ref. 6]
Cuba was a positive indication that the correlation of
forces was shifting in the direction of Moscow. How else
could a country so close to the United States , and so far
from the U.S.S.R. , utilize Soviet aid and support to become
the bastion of leftist revolution for an entire hemisphere?
Support for the above conclusion was the botched U.S. attempt
to replace Castro with an external insertion of forces. The
ease and efficacy of the 1954 intervention in Guatemala
provided U.S. policymakers with a model of indirect, covert
intervention that they attempted to duplicate against Castro
in Cuba in 1961. The Castro regime demonstrated at the Bay
of Pigs that it was much better prepared, and a more formid-
able adversary, than the Arbenz regime. As a result, a
revolutionary, expansionist anti-U.S. regime survived, and
consolidated its power [Ref. 7].
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Cuba may be the most important single political acqui-
sition of the Soviet Union in the last 30 years. Ironically,
the Cuban Communists, and the U.S.S.R., had little or nothing
to do with Fidel Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime in
1959.
The Soviet Union had maintained an influence in Cuba long
before Castro rose to power through a group called the Partido
Socialista Popular (PSP) . They, and their Chilean counterparts,
were the most politically powerful parties in Latin America
during the 19 30's, dominating their respective national labor
movements, and maintaining respectable electoral followings
until the late 1940's [Ref. 8]. Castro's "26th of July Move-
ment" is often interpreted as having been orchestrated by
Moscow, with the intent of using the Cuban Communists as the
vehicle to oust Batista. Evidence suggests that Castro was
using the PSP to his own end, strengthening his hold over all
leftist forces, and as a future cushion in his relations with
the Soviets.
Castro recruited and deployed his guerrillas with little
attention to consulting with PSP leaders. Indeed, there was
no party organization in the Castro command. On the other
hand, the Communists, who kept their small political organi-
zation together, contributed little if anything to the fight
against the Batista forces. PSP leader Bias Roca explained
that the party correctly believed that mass actions can be
transformed into an armed struggle, but that "we took no
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practical measures to realize this possibility for a long
time. [We thought this could happen spontaneously.] We didn't
train, nor arm, our cadres ... that was our mistake." [Ref. 9]
The PSP remained critical of the "26th of July Movement"
concerning both tactical and strategic decisions. By the
time Batista fell, the PSP was in a very weak position com-
pared to Castro's armed cadres.
The Soviets moved with little haste to solidify their
position with Castro. The U.S.S.R. extended formal recogni-
tion in January 1959, but did not sign any agreements for the
exchange of ambassadors until 16 months after Castro came to
power. Castro's goal to seek aid from the Soviets became
condiderably easier to achieve by the immediate sanctions
placed on Cuba by the Eisenhower Adminimistration . In early
I960, sanctions imposed included the termination of U.S. sugar
purchases and oil deliveries, and support for Cuban emigre
insurgent groups in training in the United States [Ref. 10]
.
Khrushchev agreed to purchase Cuban sugar, and to provide
military backing, (the latter of which proved to be instrumen-
tal in repulsing the Bay of Pigs invasion). The U.S. knee-jerk
reaction to Fidel Castro's successes not only opened the door
to a Soviet patronship of Cuba, but also, undoubtedly, acceler-
ated that relationship. Although the Bay of Pigs was a total
failure (costing Alan Dulles his position as Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency) , the U.S. administration would
continue its covert efforts through Operation Mongoose—a CIA
20
directed operation consisting of paramilitary, sabotage, and
political propaganda activities directed against Cuba between
October 1961 and 1962 [Ref . 11]
.
The obvious threat from the United States , coupled with
the bright hope of promising revolutionary opportunities in
the region, led by the Cubans, made for a close relationship
between Moscow and Havana. Both leaderships had fundamental
common interests, i.e., survival of Castro's regime, and the
future health of Cuban socialism. Even with these common
interests and a mutual enemy, the honeymoon period between
Cuba and the U.S.S.R. was short-lived.
From the very beginning (up to and including the present),
Castro has sought some sort of firm guarantee from the Soviet
leadership to defend Cuba in the event of an attack by the
United States. This issue first arose in 1960 when Castro
sought Soviet aid in response to U.S. sanctions. Khrush-
chev's response was more figurative than concrete, refusing
to pin down the Soviet Union to any sort of official defense
agreement. Laid to rest only momentarily, this issue emerged
again in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Whether or
not Soviet offensive weapons were sent to Cuba at Castro's
request, as alleged by the Soviets, or were installed there
by mutual agreement, as Castro later claimed [Ref. 12] , is
not an issue to be taken up here. The answer to that
question may never be known.
21
C. FRICTION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND HAVANA
What is clear is the negative effect the Missile Crisis
had on relations between the Soviet and Cuban leaderships.
The Soviets were quickly disillusioned from their grandiose
perceptions about the potential for revolution in the Carib-
bean. They soon sobered to the fact that this confrontation
clearly pointed to the limitations of Soviet conventional
forces (the Soviet Navy) to deal head-to-head with the United
States; and that, in addition, John F. Kennedy's refusal to
be cowed led the basically conservative Soviet leadership to
conclude that, for the time being, it would be best to let
the dust settle in the American backyard. For two years,
relations between Moscow and Havana were soured because of
Castro's anger over having been left out of the settlement
of the Missile Crisis.
The 1960 's were a time of continued friction and failure
for the Soviet/Cuban team. The disappointing results of
Cuban-backed revolutionaries in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru,
Columbia, Venezuela, and Bolivia added to the sense of let-
down. More basic was the fundamental disagreement between
the two collaborating leaderships over how best to proceed
with revolutionary aims in the region.
The disagreement between the Soviets and Cubans in the
1960 's centered around methods. Moscow was opposed to Cuba's
promotion of armed struggle in the region because it would
run counter to their desire to establish state-to-state
22
relations in Central and Latin America and would unneces-
sarily antagonize the United States. Castro and his fellow
revolutionaries wished to promote revolution in several Latin
countries simultaneously, utilizing a guerrilla force, and
thus bypass Communist Parties. As one Sovietologist, Jiri
Valenta, argues:
Castro, who was in favor of a "genuinely revolu-
tionary road," criticized the Soviet Union for dealing
with capitalist governments in Latin America. In
adhering to Ernesto "Che" Guevara's concept of guer-
rilla/peasantry insurgency, Castro's strategy in the
Caribbean Basin and elsewhere in South America in
the 1960's, contradicted and even challenged the
Soviet doctrine allowing for diversified roads to
socialism. The Soviets in the late 1960's were un-
willing and unable to sponsor Castro's call to create
"two or three," and even "four or five more Vietnams"
for the United States in Latin America. As a result
of Cuban relations in the late 1960's were unsatisfactory,
at times strained almost to the breaking point. [Ref. 13]
Relations with the Soviets remained complex throughout
the sixties, marked by mutual misunderstanding and mistrust.
Castro's unpredictable ideological shifts, his attempts to
subordinate the Cuban Communist Party to his personal rule,
and his eclectic approach in dealing with Cuba's economic
ills all served to add to Moscow's unease. In his own view,
Castro saw the Soviets as neither sufficiently supportive of
his revolutionary aims , nor adequately consultative concern-
ing Soviet/U.S. negotiations addressing Cuban sovereignty.
Cuba's aggressive foreign policy was directly in opposi-
tion to the Soviet's pursuit of detente, which to the Cubans,
was a seeming abdication of Socialist internationalism.
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This caused vocal demands for increased Soviet aid to
revolutionary movements. [Ref. 14]
For ten years, this haggling continued, accommodations
being made on each side, but never for very long. Further
complicating Soviet/Cuban relations in the 1960 's was
China's interest in the new Marxist policy in the Caribbean.
The Chinese were attracted by Castro's guerrilla strategies,
and revolutionary—almost radical—brand of communism. It
appeared that Fidel Castro was cut from similar cloth as his
admirers in Peking--at least in Chinese perceptions.
Castro was keen to sense the potential for playing the
Communist giants against each other to the benefit of his
regime, and did so, much to the chagrin of the Soviet leader-
ship. Although the Chinese were ideologically more attractive
to the Cubans, they were no match for the Soviets in their
ability to render Cuba economic succor. When heavy U.S.
sanctions were imposed on the Cubans in the 1960's, it was
the Soviets, and not the Chinese, who were able and willing
to fill the vacuum thus created. In an attempt to make
amends for Castro's hurt feelings over the handling of the
Missile Crisis, in 1963 the U.S.S.R. made such favorable
trade agreement offers that Castro was willing to risk
offending the Chinese by visiting the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 15].
In the early 1970' s, trade between China and Cuba
increased, but not nearly at the same rate as that between
Cuba and the Soviets. Except for a brief period in the
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middle 1960 's, Cuban trade with China rarely exceeded (and
was often less than) ten percent of its total trade [Ref. 16].
Thus, in a choice of patrons, Castro's Marxist-revolutionary
state appears to have made its choice, not based on ideology,
but on dollars and cents.
Throughout the 1960's, another major bone of contention
between the Soviets and Cubans was the situation in Venezuela,
and Castro's role in the attempted overthrow of the democratic
government of Betancourt, which had come to power about the
same time as Castro. Betancourt, a reformist democrat, had
taken some of the limelight away from Fidel's revolution.
Castro viewed him as a threat to his own regional designs.
The Soviets, too, saw the situation in Venezuela as threaten-
ing. Where Moscow and Havana parted ways was on the issue of
the best method in dealing with the perceived threat. The
Cubans were closely allied with the dissident Venezuelan
National Liberation Front (FALN) , as well as with other guer-
rilla groups. On the other hand, the Soviets insisted upon
working within the structure of the Venezuelan Communist Party
This difference generally has been viewed as a primary factor
of the failure of the guerrilla movement in Venezuela. The
Cubans were highly critical of the Soviet's failure to assist
materially and politically in the guerrilla movement in
favor of more conservative means. In turn, the Soviets
accused Cubans of pursuing left-wing extremist policies.
The overall effect of the failure of the Venezuelan insurgency
25
was to dampen for the next decade any Soviet perspectives and
expectations concerning the potential for revolution in the
region. In the words of William Luers
:
The Venezuelan Government's victory over the
guerrillas was first and foremost the result of
nearly a decade of combining wise political and
economic policies with forceful military action,
supported, by the way, with substantial U.S. mili-
tary assistance. The failure of the guerrilla
movement in Venezuela in the late 1960 's persuaded
the Soviets that the Cuban vision of revolutionary
potential was wrong, and was not in line with Soviet
interests. The failure in Venezuela helped to per-
suade the Cubans that they needed to take two steps
backward on the revolutionary issue. [Ref. 17]
Cuba came to a turning point in 196 8 with the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Cuban economy was in
no better shape than at the outset of Castro's initial
attempts to revitalize it, and no doubt these troubles were
exacerbated by a punitive cutback in Soviet oil deliveries
in 1967 [Ref. 18] . That the Cubans had finally been brought
into line in 1968 is evidenced by Castro's support (albeit
qualified) to the above-mentioned Soviet intervention. Most
of the Cuban-based guerrilla movements in Latin America,
including the Che Guevara group in Bolivia, were dead--or
nearly so. Perhaps the fear of a U.S. response against
Cuba for the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, coupled with
the failure of his revolutionary focus and an ailing economy,
served as the final conglomeration of events which broke
Fidel Castro's rebellious and confrontal stance.
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D. IMPROVED RELATIONS
The 1970 's saw a marked increase of economic, political,
and military ties between the Soviets and Cubans. The failure
to achieve a $10 million sugar harvest in 1970 marked the end
of Castro's efforts to maintain an autonomous political pro-
gram. The resulting economic disorganization served to under-
score Cuba's dependence on Soviet aid. By 1972, satisfied
that the U.S.S.R. now called the tune, Brezhnev went beyond
all previous Soviet pronouncements on Cuba's precise position
in the Communist world [Ref. 19]. Speaking in June 1972,
during Castro's first visit to Moscow in eight years, Brezhnev
declared:
Soviet Cuba is not alone.... Its international
positions, its interests and security are safeguarded
reliably not only by the firm policy of the Communist
Party of Cuba and the heroism of its revolutionary
people, but also by the support and political weight
of the U. S. S. R. . . . We stated this many times before,
and we are repeating this with a full sense of
responsibility now. [Ref. 20]
In July 1972, Cuba was formally admitted to the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
, the first instance
of such admission of a Communist country not geographically
contiguous to the Soviet bloc. In 1974, Brezhnev made the
first visit of a Soviet party leader to Latin America to
formalize a new set of political and economic agreements
between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. Thus the world witnessed
the beginning of the period often referred to as the
"collaborative 19 70 's." Revolution could wait; Cuba needed
to build and solidify its economy. What no one could forsee
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during this period was the impact Cuba would have in the
Third World as a tool of the Soviet Politburo.
Having become a valuable partner for the Soviets , Cuba
has tended to take sides in Sino/Soviet disputes over the
last two decades. Since the Chinese were in no position
to match the Soviets in economic or military aid to the
Cubans , this no doubt was an important factor in the Cuban
decision to side with the Soviets in Third World forums.
Of greater significance has been Cuba's new and unique role
as a fighting force of the Soviets in Africa. Fidel Castro
had far closer ties than the Soviets with many African revo-
lutionary leaders in the 1960 's and 1970 's. Cuba had been
providing hospitality and training to the revolutionary
forces of such African leaders as Ben Bella and Nkrumah
,
and began to send military missions and combat troops to
Algeria and the Congo (Brazzaville) [Ref . 21]
.
When the escalation of the Angolan Civil War brought
South African troops into the conflict in 1975, the Soviets
refrained from sending the Popular Movement for the National
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) any additional arms. Cuba
promptly filled the vacuum by sending its own troops via
converted freighters and obsolete aircraft [Ref. 22]. In
1978, Cuban troops with Soviet advisors provided support
for a besieged Ethiopian Government under attack from
Somalia, which proved decisive in that conflict. Estimates
are between 16,000 and 17,000 Cuban combat troops were
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involved in the conflict [Ref. 23]. Cuban military involve-
ment overseas to the present time is prodigious. Cuban forces
abroad today by best estimate are: 19,000 in Angola; 750 in
the Congo; 3,000 in Ethiopia; 750 in Mozambique; 2,000 in
Iraq; 3,000 in Libya; 3,000 in Nicaragua; and 300 in South
Yemen [Ref. 24] .
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III. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
A. OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM
A common criticism of the Reagan Administration has been
the charge that it seeks to turn a North-South issue (i.e.,
social revolution in Central America and the attempt to
throw off the "shackles" of U.S. imperialism) into an East-
West issue. The problem should be obvious to even the most
casual observer that the diverse factors at play in Central
America are further complicated by the role of Soviet/Cuban
influence. An effective U.S. policy can no more ignore the
Soviet hand at work than it could the political, social,
economic, or historical factors in Central America. In the
words of former Mexican President Lopez Portillo, the Carib-
bean Basin has been converted into a "frontier" between the
United States and the U.S.S.R.: "The U.S. problem is not
with Nicaragua or Cuba... the U.S. problem is with the Soviet
Union." [Ref. 25]
Soviet activity and attitudes in the Caribbean Basin
reflect optimism or pessimism, depending upon their percep-
tions of the potential for revolutionary activity in the
region, and the perceived "correlation of forces," an almost
mystical measure for which the Soviets have a great affection.
Soviet optimism in response to new and promising revolution-
ary situations peaked following the revolution in Cuba (1959)
,
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Grenada (February 1979) , and Nicaragua (June 1979) . The
last two events acted as a strong counterbalance to the
ambivalence seen in Soviet writings on the potential for
armed struggle in the U.S. backyard. Both Grenada and Nica-
ragua proved that Socialist-oriented revolutions are possible
in the geographic proximity of the United States. That the
Carter administration tolerated these events, as well as the
growing insurgency in El Salvador, was a fact not lost on
the Soviets.
A careful reading of the Soviets' analysis of
Carter's policies, however, suggests the Soviet
belief that Carter, with his new emphasis on human
rights, was less able to use "traditional methods"
of "power politics" to deal with the revolutionary
wave (or its supporters in Cuba and the U.S.S.R.
for that matter) which had materialized during the
final two years of his tenure, 1979-1980. The
Soviets seem to suggest, at least indirectly, that
this support for the new revolutionary movements in
the Caribbean Basin and Central America was less
costly under Carter than his successor. This per-
ception further argues against any "backing down"
or dampening of the Soviet attitude toward Central
America in the early days of this decade. [Ref. 26]
The Carter administration's policy toward Latin America
was one of reaction instead of positive action. The admin-
istration sought policies which were supportive of strong,
friendly, and independent governments that would practice
democracy and protect human rights, economic development,
and security against hostile forces. Such policies, in the
words of former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Viron P. Vaky, would "align us with the
forces of change, of democracy, and of peaceful development
that alone can overcome socioeconomic inequities." [Ref. 27]
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No overall framework for formulating policies toward
Latin America evolved during the Carter administration,
regardless of the well-intentioned meaning of the previously
cited goals. Latin American policy became, in fact, a
reaction to one crisis after another: The Panama Canal
Treaties, Mexican economic and social conditions, the fall
of Somoza and the rise of the Sandinistas, the Soviet mili-
tary brigade in Cuba, the political disintegration of
Central America, and the refugee flows of Haitians and
Cubans. These events added to the conceptual weakness of
Carter's Latin American policy. [Ref. 28]
The Soviet leadership observed the turmoil in the region,
and the Carter administrations' seeming inability to cope
with that turmoil as an opportunity for increased activity
through its client-state, Cuba. This time of new "oppor-
tunity" is reflected in Soviet writing, with the Nicaraguan
experience as the watershed. The Sandinistas, in the Soviet
view, skillfully exploited U.S. weaknesses in 1979, and demon-
strated that a pro-American regime can be defeated in the U.S.
strategic backyard. In World Marxist Review , we read:
The Sandinistas were able to use the contra-
dictions among the ruling circles of the USA, doing
so flexibly, if at an understandable risk. In the
present-day conditions
,
[Underline mine.] a pro-
imperialist regime can be defeated not only in distant
areas of Africa or Asia, but in that part of the Latin
American region seen by the USA as its closest
"strategic hinterland," and where traditional U.S.
influence is particularly strong. [Ref. 29]
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In the Soviet perception, the correlation of forces had
shifted toward Moscow.
The operationalization of this new attitude is reflected
in the Cuban strategy of aggressively promoting armed conflict
This Cuban strategy is reminiscent of that of the 1960 's with
one important exception. Instead of throwing in obstacles,
the U.S.S.R. has backed Cuban efforts to incorporate non-
doctrinaire groups into broad political-military fronts
dedicated to armed struggle. With Castro in the visible
lead, the Soviets supported Cuban policies through massive
financial aid ($8 million a day) and military assistance to
Cuba [Ref . 30]
.
The new Soviet/Cuban strategy departs from earlier efforts
to develop state-to-state relations which traditionally has
been a strong motivation for the Soviets in Latin America.
The 1960 's were a turning point in Soviet ties with Latin
America. Castro established diplomatic relations with the
U.S.S.R. in 1960, and was soon followed by the Goulart
government in Brazil in 1961, and Eduardo Frei of Chile who
exchanged diplomatic representatives with Moscow in 1964.
After the temporary setback of the Cuban Missile Crisis
1962, and Havana's slow, but sure, acquiesence to Soviet
pressure for moderation, the building of diplomatic channels
for the Soviets continued. The pro-Soviet parties appeared
rather clearly to prefer electoral participation and the
formation of popular fronts to armed struggle [Ref. 31]
.
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Between 1968 and 1970, the Soviets exchanged diplomatic
representatives with five Andean countries: Bolivia, Peru,
Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In the 1970's, relations
were established in and around the Caribbean with Costa Rica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Nicaragua. (The Soviet Union
broke relations with Chile in 1973 after the fall of Allende.)
In most cases, the U.S.S.R. played the role of suitor:
first it secured recognition of the Soviet state; and secondly,
it exchanged diplomatic representatives; and finally, it
established economic, cultural, and political relations. The
U.S.S.R. did not ordinarily make ideological or political
criteria conditions of diplomatic relations [Ref. 32]. The
goal of state-to-state diplomatic relations with most of the
nations of the world, especially the Third World, and speci-
fically Latin America, has been high on the list of Soviet
objectives in its never-ending quest for self-legitimization
as a major power.
B. STRATEGY SINCE 1979
Since 1979, this strategy has taken a back seat to the
concept of promoting armed conflict in Central America. With
what one must assume is full Soviet approval, Cuba is engaged
in uniting the radical left, committing it to the use of
violence, training it in warfare and terrorism, and attempt-
ing to use it to destroy existing governments and replace
them with Marxist-Leninist regimes on the Cuban model [Ref. 33]
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The pessimism reflected in Soviet thought concerning the
"inevitable" spread of socialism in the Third World was a
thing of the past [Ref . 34] .
It is important to note the changing attitude of the role
of the Communist Party in the struggle for socialism. An
important sectarian aspect of the differences in attitude
between Moscow and Havana has been the proper role for ortho-
dox Moscow-leaning Communist Parties in political and revolu-
tionary change. Moscow's difference with the Castro regime
over this point has long been an issue, sometimes theoretical,
although not always, which has created misunderstanding and
lack of coordination in various Central and Latin American
political arenas. The role of the party has been at the
center of Soviet disputes with China, and the Soviet moves in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland [Ref. 35] . There is
ample evidence that this issue is a continuing source of dif-
ference with Cuba. Castro has always preferred to deal with
brother revolutionaries than with party bureaucrats. Again
from William Luers
:
In an extended discussion of this problem in...
Latinskaya Amerika ...M. F. Gornov invokes Lenin to
support his basic point on the role of the Party.
"It is not enough simply to call ourselves the
'vanguard' or 'advance detachment,' we must also
act in such a way that all other detachments
realize and admit that we are taking the lead.
This charge of Lenin must not be forgotten today,"
adds Gornov, "now that the various forces have
joined the anti-imperialist movement." [Ref. 36]
Soviet embarrassment by the failure of the Moscow-backed
"Nicaraguan Socialist Party" to play an integral role in the
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Sandinista revolution is yet another example of this ideolog-
ical split. Moscow has consistently maneuvered to control
revolutionary events by exhorting its parties not to sit on
the sidelines. T. Ye Vorozheykino wrote in Latinskaya
Amerika of
:
...the regrettable experience of the Nicaraguan
Socialist Party which clearly demonstrated that
a party which does not unite with other leftist
forces faces the root danger of being left on the
sidelines of the revolutionary struggle. [Ref. 37]
These Soviet lamentations serve as evidence that revolu-
tionary movements in Central America, and elsewhere in the
Third World, are not only Soviet-sponsored, but preferably
Soviet-controlled. It is likely that the Communist Party in
El Salvador, at Soviet insistence, will take an increasingly
active role in future actions against the Duarte government.
This may also be the case in other Central American countries
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IV. THE SOVIET/CUBAN THREAT
A. SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN
HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE AND IMPLICATIONS
In the last twenty-odd years , the Soviet Union has ruptured
the U.S. security sphere on the southern flank. It has accom-
plished this significant task through the use of naval forces,
and its unsinkable staging base/aircraft carrier—Cuba.
The Soviet Navy has become a far-flung, world-
ranging, blue water force making its presence felt
throughout the world as an extension of the Kremlin.
The Soviet Navy is a symbol of the fraternity of
peace-loving peoples. In recent years, our warships
have made scores of visits to countries in Europe,
Africa, Asia, America, and everywhere Soviet seamen
are welcomed as honored guests , sincere friends , as
envoys and defenders of peace. [Ref. 38]
These words of then-Defense Minister Marshal Grechko
almost 15 years ago heralded the beginning of a new era in
Soviet naval activity. The coastal navy of the 1950 's and
1960 *s was giving way to a globe-trotting, flag-showing force
which would take its lessons from the U.S. Navy. The utility
of a blue water navy to the political strategists in Moscow
was slowly becoming a reality. Port visits as described
above by Grechko were becoming a frequent reality.
Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov's Soviet Navy is one with
a political mission no less significant than its military
role. Gorshkov's tremendous influence in the changed naval
doctrine of the Soviet Union can be observed in the rhetoric
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and actions of Soviet naval "experts," and the actual deploy-
ment of Soviet naval forces in the Caribbean. "Gunboat
diplomacy" and "showing of the flag," once the exclusive ex-
tensions of national foreign policy for great Western powers
,
has become an implement of standard usage for the Soviet
Union. Therefore, before illustrating the military threat
from the Soviet and Cuban naval forces in the Caribbean, a
brief review of Soviet declaratory policy toward their naval
forces in the Caribbean Basin is in order. This policy
(probably under the urging of Gorshkov and other hard-liners
in the ruling elite) has led to such significant tests of
U.S. patience and political will as the Cienfuegos incident,
and increased Soviet (and later Cuban) naval presence in the
region.
Gorshkov 1 s desire for a blue water force sufficient to
provide the state with political clout is best exemplified
in these words from his now classic work , The Sea, Power of
the State : "With the emergence of the Navy onto the ocean
expanses, the Soviet Union acquired new and more wide-spread
opportunities to utilize it in peacetime support of her own
state interests." [Ref. 39]
In addition to the above, in Gorshkov' s view, sea power,
if utilized efficiently, can be employed in "suppressing the
aggressive aspirations of imperialism, of deterring military
adventures, and of decisively countering threats to the
security of peoples on the part of imperialist powers."
[Ref. 40]
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More specifically, recent senior Soviet naval authorities
have seen the role of the Navy as twofold: first, as a com-
bat force capable of exerting stability in a potentially
volatile situation; and second, to render aid to developing
countries in response to aggression [Ref . 41] . Cuba and the
Caribbean fall into the category referred to above. Soviet
naval presence, however, has not been used as a stabilizing
influence in the Caribbean thus far, but merely as a psycho-
logical thorn in the side of the United States. It is critical
to note that this holds true only for Soviet surface units
which are relatively easy to locate and destroy in time of
conflict. The presence of Soviet nuclear submarines presents
a significantly more serious problem--one far more real than
psychological as it concerns Soviet/Cuban maritime activity.
Soviet naval writing, in addition to addressing the
perceived political and military roles of the Soviet Navy,
also serves as a rhetorical point of departure against U.S.
activity in the Caribbean Basin. For instance, in regard to
the Panama Canal situation in 1979, Morskoy Sbornik stated:
The American aggressors do not want to get out
of this strategically important area. The paradox-
icality of the situation that this had arisen lies
in the fact that the Americans , who are the de facto
owners of this important waterway cannot exercise
unshared command of the Canal Zone and not impose
their will on the Panamanian people. [Ref. 42]
And, an even more severe criticism from the same source
two years later:
While using political and cultural cooperation
among the members of this organization as a cover,
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the United States in fact uses the Organization of
Central American States for armed intervention in
the domestic affairs of countries in the Caribbean.
[Ref. 43]
The Soviet claims as to their purposes in the Caribbean
have been examined, but what can be determined from their
actions? What is the real aim of the Soviet Union in its
forays into the Caribbean Basin?
In a discussion between the author and Michel Tatu, that
French Sovietologist expressed his belief that the Soviets
repeatedly seek to disprove the notion of the Monroe Doctrine
as it applies to naval forces, and to test the limits of U.S.
patience and tolerance. Like U.S. deployments into the Black
Sea, Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean likewise seeks
the level of tolerance of the opposing superpower. There the
similarity ends. Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean has
become far more than a symbolic gesture, having metamorpha-
sized itself into a genuine security threat [Ref. 44]. The
term "naval presence" covers more ground than the simple
utilization of local naval facilities. It includes additional
elements such as priority for a particular nation's warships
and the high-visibility and commensurate status such presence
creates
.
To understand that threat as it exists today, a brief
review of the chronology of Soviet naval and air activity
in the Caribbean will be covered. This threat is particu-
larly worrisome when viewed in the light of Cuba's tremendous
military ascendency in the same region.
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Soviet combatent deployments to Cuba began in July 1969.
By the fall of 1970, construction of a submarine base had
begun at Cienfuegos. Although this base eventually was dis-
established by agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
it was yet another attempt by the Soviets to strengthen their
foothold in the region while simultaneously testing the poli-
tical will of the U.S. leadership.
The exact terms of that agreement remain unclear to this
day. The Cienfuegos Agreement of 1970 was negotiated in
large part by Henry Kissinger (then National Security Advisor
to President Nixon) , and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The
basic agreement was a sort of fuzzy extension of the 1962
understanding over Soviet offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba.
These were, of course, land-based weapons. In 19 70, it was
necessary to agree upon what naval forces were "strategic"
in nature. The issue was murky from the beginning.
The initial U.S. response to Soviet penetration of the
Caribbean was neither firm nor unequivocal. The White House
and State Department had no comment on the Soviet naval visits
The Department of Defense maintained constant surveillance
of the Soviet units, and kept the press relatively well-
informed of their whereabouts. The interpretation of this
early deployment was limited to such statements as: "the
Department [of Defense] views the Soviet ship transit as
an 'illustration of growing Soviet capabilities'." [Ref. 45]
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The initial deployment of the Soviet Navy had been made
prior to the Cienfuegos incident. This first deployment
included a guided missile cruiser (KYNDA-class) , a guided
missile destroyer (KILDIN-class) , a guided missile frigate
(KASHIN-class) , two submarines (one nuclear-powered) , a sub-
marine tender, and an oiler. Following the Cuban visit, port
calls were made to Barbados and Martinique [Ref . 46] . In
May 1970, a second task group entered the Caribbean composed
of a KRESTA I-class guided missile cruiser, a KANIN-class
guided missile destroyer, two FOXTROT-class diesel submarines,
an ECHO-II nuclear cruise missile submarine, an oiler, and a
submarine tender. Havana and Cienfuegos were visited, but
no other Caribbean ports. This was the first occasion that
the West witnessed the employment of Bear-D reconnaissance
aircraft in the region--a precedent of no less import than
the appearance of Soviet warships. In April 1970, two of
these aircraft flew nonstop from bases in Murmansk, down
the Norwegian Sea, across the Atlantic, and landed in Cuba
[Ref. 47]. This early flight plan, part of Okean-70, has
become a familiar flight plan in the 1970' s and 1980' s.
In August 1970, U.S. intelligence had determined that
construction activity in and around Cienfuegos was underway
for some sort of naval facility, the aim of which would be
the support of Soviet submarines. The first public reaction
from the U.S. administration came on September 25th, when
the White House, basing its statement upon the 1962 Cuban
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Missile Crisis "understanding" between Kennedy and Khrushchev,
stated that the President would "...view the establishment of
a strategic base in the Caribbean with utmost seriousness."
[Ref. 48]
Two weeks of secret U.S. /Soviet negotiations were followed
on October 10th by the departure from Cienfuegos of the sub-
marine tender and the rescue tug. A presidential statement
on 4 January 19 71 revealed an understanding reached between
the two nations on 11 October, and a formal TASS announce-
ment on 13 October that the Soviet Union was not building
a base in Cuba was corroborated by the Department of Defense
[Ref. 49]
.
The 19 70 Cienfuegos Agreement expanded upon the 196 2
Missile Crisis understanding which had centered around the
concept of prohibiting the introduction of Soviet offensive
nuclear weapons in Cuba. In a radio and television broadcast
on 4 January 1971, President Nixon described the agreement
over Cienfuegos as an extension of the Missile Crisis under-
standing in which President Kennedy had been assured by the
Soviet leadership that the U.S.S.R. would never place offensive
nuclear weapons in Cuba again. Earlier, the State Department
had issued the following statement concerning the issue of
Soviet weapons and bases in the Western Hemisphere:
State Department officials said today that
the United States had received private assurances
from the Soviet Union that it would not introduce
offensive weapons into the Western Hemisphere, or
establish bases for the use of such weapons. It
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was understood that "offensive weapons" in this
context was synonymous with nuclear weapons. [Ref. 50]
The Cienfuegos Agreement probably included the issue of
servicing nuclear submarines from Cuba:
Reliable American sources indicate that the heart
of the understanding is on an unwritten pledge by the
Soviet Union not to base missile-carrying nuclear sub-
marines, store nuclear weapons, or install repair and
servicing facilities anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.
[Ref. 51]
In the same article, the subject of the submarine tender
was directly addressed:
Mr. McCloskey [State Department spokesman] said
that Soviet naval craft— including a submarine tender
and two barges used to collect radioactive effluent
from nuclear submarine reactors—were still at Cien-
fuegos. Their continuing presence, he said, would not
be construed as a violation of the unwritten understanding.
[Ref. 52]
As mentioned earlier, the precise details of the Cienfue-
gos Agreement are still a mystery. The interpretation of the
bounds of that agreement seemed to have shifted with time as
evidenced by the somewhat contradictory content of statements
from U.S. officials subsequent to the agreement. If the Cien-
fuegos Agreement was an extension or supplement to the U.S./
Soviet 1962 understanding over offensive nuclear weapons in
Cuba, then the topic of discussion and agreement would be over
nuclear ballistic missiles. But was it? In a January 1971
television address, President Nixon stated: "Now, in the
event nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or
from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding."
[Ref. 53]
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If President Nixon was including Soviet nuclear attack
submarines in his policy statement, was he excluding the
diesel-electric, ballistic missile submarine (SSB) ? It could
be argued that this lack of precision in the President's
language was the loophole through which the Soviets eventually
would drive their GOLF-class SSB's into the Caribbean for both
deployments and port visits to Cuba.
On the other hand, Henry Kissinger concerned himself with
bases and not naval units, and as a result, he concentrated
much of his energy in discussions with Gromyko and Dobrynin
on the basing issue. This concern with basing was extended
to tenders (contrary to the earlier State Department stand on
the same subject) , and communicated to Dobrynin by Kissinger
after the 14 February 19 71 arrival in Havana of a submarine
tender with a Soviet Task Force, in addition to a NOVEMBER-
class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) , and the May 1971
arrival of a tender with an ECHO-II SSGN. Pressure on the
Soviets led to the withdrawal of the tender shortly after
its arrival in May. In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote that he
considered this a significant victory, for not only did the
Soviets withdraw, they also did not attempt to deploy what
the Nixon administration considered the most important combin-
ation: a tender with a nuclear-powered, ballistic missile
submarine [Ref . 54] .
The ambiguity of the Nixon administration's position on
Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean was again exploited
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by the Politburo in May of 1972 with the port visit to Cuba
of a GOLF-II SSB in company with a submarine tender and
destroyer. The GOLF-II visit to Havana preceeded the Nixon/
Brezhnev summit in Moscow later that month. If there was a
connection between the two events, it has yet to be substan-
tiated. Indeed, it may simply have been a case of the right
hand not altogether knowing what the left hand was doing.
GOLF-II was to visit a Cuban port again (Havana) , and
with much fanfare, in April 19 74. This proved to be the
second and last GOLF-II deployment to the Caribbean—perhaps
as some Soviet last, face-saving gesture.
The lesson to be drawn from the above is as simple as it
is important. Between 1969 and 1974, the Soviet Union had
set out to test U.S. resolve as it pertained to the ability
of Soviet naval forces, equipped for the strategic warefare
role, to ply Caribbean waters and utilize Cuban facilities.
The United States responded firmly, albeit sometimes unclearly,
in each situation as it unfolded. Testing Caribbean waters
with their strategic forces, the Soviets found that these
forays were met by a frosty U.S. reception, each and every
time. To their credit, Moscow's leadership maximized the
potential of each policy ambiguity presented by the Nixon
administration as it pertained to Soviet strategic assets in
the Caribbean—hence the SSB deployments. Yet, the time for
experimenting with such forays came to an end with the
Soviets understanding that the White House, regardless of
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who occupied its oval office, would accept no hostile SSB's
or SSBN's in the strategic backyard of the United States.
The unacceptable nature of that threat had eventually been
communicated.
It is interesting to note that when the Soviets sought
a response to U.S. deployments of Pershing II (IRBM) and
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) into Europe in 1984,
their response was to place SSGN's off the eastern coast of
the United States, and to bring DELTA-class SSBN's out of
their Arctic bastions into the Atlantic. The response was
not to send strategic missile armed naval units into the
Caribbean Basin. The sensitivity of such a move was not lost
upon the Kremlin. The lesson had been learned.
B. THE CUBAN THREAT: STRATEGIC
Cuba now poses a threat that has the potential to alter
the geostrategic position of the United States in the Carib-
bean Basin, and in the event of a general war or U.S. /Soviet
conflict elsewhere, severely complicate the global military
equation for the United States.
Cuba is a small island-nation which, ironically, is the
number-two military power (after the United States) in the
Caribbean Basin. The threat Cuba presents stems from that
nation's inextricable military ties with the U.S.S.R. and the
closely collaborative nature of their patron/client relation-
ship. The impact Cuba has on U.S. security in the region is
greatly amplified by the island's geographic position, sitting
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astride the Caribbean Sea, commanding the entrance to the
Gulf of Mexico and the Florida Straits. The eastern approaches
to Central America are also in the Cuban military net. The
transport of crude oil to this country is accomplished through
use of the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) . These ships are
between 175,000 and 400,000 deadweight tons, and the even
larger Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) is over 400,000 tons.
They have drafts of between 60 and 90 feet, thus severely
restricting the areas of ocean in which they may travel
safely. In the Caribbean Basin, this restricts those ports
which may service such ships (Fig. 1) , and the open and con-
ditional ocean spaces in which such ships may travel (Fig. 2).
Therefore, the already critical chokepoint areas are made even
easier to delineate where Soviet and Cuban forces may concentrate
The strategic threat Cuba poses takes two forms. The first
and most plausible is the threat to Caribbean sealanes of com-
munication (SLOC) presented by the Soviet and Cuban air and
naval forces. From a Rand Corporation study:
In the event of a U.S. /Soviet confrontation, a
hostile Cuba, as an ally of Moscow, could endanger
the sealanes (SLOC's) in the Caribbean that are
vital, not only to the United States and Caribbean
Basin states, but to Western Europe as well.... To
be sure, a rational Cuban leadership would seek to
avoid being drawn into a war with the United States
because the conflict would result in heavy civilian
as well as military casualties on the island. Still
there are conditions under which the strategic threat
posed by Cuba cannot be ignored without serious peril
to U.S. security, and these conditions could turn out
to be beyond the control of even the most rational
Cuban leaders. [Ref. 55]
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Figure 1. Major Oil Ports Serving the Gulf/Caribbean.
Source: Anderson, Thomas D. , Geopolitics of the Caribbean
,
Hoover Institute, 1984, p. 116.
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Figure 2. Negative, Conditional, and Open Ocean for Deep-
Draft Tankers.
Source: Anderson, Thomas D., Geopolitics of the Caribbean
,
Hoover Institute, 1984, p. 118.
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The primary threat to the SLOC ' s comes from the Soviet
collaboration with Cuba. The Soviet Navy and Air Force have
had great success in penetrating the Caribbean Basin through
a gradual process, and overall acquiescence on the part of
the United States. As noted earlier, the Soviets were forced
to halt their construction of a base for nuclear submarines
in Cienfuegos in the fall of 1970. Regardless and irrespec-
tive of this setback, the Soviet Navy is a far different
force than that which the United States faced during the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962. It now is a legitimate blue water
navy, and considers the Caribbean one of its operating areas.
Between 1969 and 1981, eleven Soviet task forces of varying
composition sortied into the Caribbean with nearly all of
the units making port visits to Cuba [Ref. 56]. Early in
1984, a VICTOR-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
,
experiencing propulsion problems in the mid-Atlantic, even-
tually was towed to Cuba by a Soviet auxiliary unit for
repairs
.
The problem which a near constant Soviet naval presence
presents for U.S. planners should be obvious. The Nixon/
Brezhnev understanding after the Cienfuegos incident of 1971
is nearly meaningless. The Soviets have accomplished their
aim of a naval presence in the Basin without a direct con-
frontation. Simply put, this presence means that at the
outbreak of hostilities between the Soviet Union and the
United States, Soviet naval units—especially nuclear sub-
marines—will already be in place for SLOC interdiction.
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This would present the U.S. Navy with the complex mission of
dealing with these submarines, further taxing U.S. anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) assets which will be needed desper-
ately in other NATO theaters, i.e., the North and Central
Atlantic.
The second aspect of the Soviet/Cuban anti-SLOC capability
also stems from Cuba as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Soviet
and Cuban air assets could prove crippling in a conventional
anti-SLOC campaign. The Soviets regularly deploy their long-
range TU-95 maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba on south-
ern swings from North Fleet bases. These aircraft, with a
range of nearly 9,000 miles, are equipped for followup guidance
of sea-targeted missiles launched from submarines or surface
ships. Although old (c. 1965) , slow, and highly vulnerable
to interceptor aircraft, they are invaluable in their intel-
ligence collection mode in a peacetime or near-war environment.
These aircraft operate regularly from Cuba; in all likelihood
they were destined to operate from the Point Salines airport
in Grenada, and eventually would be able to operate from
Nicaragua.
Table II, following, illustrates the prodigious capability
and high quality of the Cuban Air Force as it exists today.
With its MIG-2 3 FLOGGER-B (nonexport) aircraft, the Cuban
Air Force could cause serious damage in the initial stages
of a conventional conflict, especially to shipping in the
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miles, MIG-2 3's could operate throughout the region, refueling
in Nicaragua on one-way sorties which enhance on-target time.
Even without the use of refueling, the combat radii of these
aircraft allow them command of most of the Basin (Fig. 3)
.
Again, in the event of a conventional conflict, the United
States would attempt to destroy as many of these aircraft
on the ground as quickly as possible. Not all would be des-
troyed in the initial airstrike (unless it was a tactical-
nuclear strike, which would be a major escalation step for
the U.S. to undertake). Those escaping the first U.S. air-
strike could create havoc with suicidal missions.
The Cuban Air Defense System is worthy of mention at this
juncture. It is a common misconception that in a liesurely
afternoon's flying, the U.S. Air Force would remove all
military targets worth destroying from the Cuban landscape.
The Cuban Air Defense System is impressive, comprised of the
elements listed in Table III. These weapons, coupled with
numerous combat aircraft would make for a costly U.S. opera-
tion. Even in a joint USAF/USN operation, the destruction or
neutralization of the Cuban Armed Forces would be a costly
and time-consuming task. Again, the use of tactical nuclear
weapons would greatly simplify this problem for U.S. planners,
but again, at what cost elsewhere? It is unlikely that the
use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States would
go unanswered by the Soviets , who would feel compelled to
respond in kind. In any event, scenarios of this type are




Figure 3. Strategic Implications of Aircraft Based in Cuba,
Grenada, and Nicaragua.
Source: Anderson, Thomas D. , Geopolitics of the Caribbean
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In addition to the above, the following antiaircraft weapons
exist in the Cuban inventory:








—M-53 (Twin) /BTR-60P (30mm)
— ZSU-57 (Self-propelled 57mm)
—SA-7 (MSL)
— SA-9 (MSL)
Source: The Military Balance: 1984-1985 , International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1984.
The last significant Soviet/Cuban threat to the SLOC '
s
comes from Cuba's rapidly expanded Navy. The Cuban Navy,
operating with modern Soviet platforms, sensors, and weapons,
has become a force with which to reckon in the Caribbean.
Table IV illustrates the present composition of the Cuban
naval forces.
The Cuban Navy presents several problems for U.S. strate-
gists. Submarines, especially diesel-electric submarines, are
time-consuming and difficult targets to detect and track. Their
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"invisible" to hunting antisubmarine warfare units. As a
submarine warfare officer, having worked against the diesel-
electric submarine from a nuclear submarine platform, this
author can personally attest to the above. In the ASW world,
the diesel submarine is said to make as much noise "as a
flashlight."
The FOXTROT-class SS , with its 12,000 nautical-mile range
(at five knots) , can reach into any section of the Caribbean
Basin. It is logical to assume that these valuable units
already will be deployed at the onset of hostilities between
the superpowers. It is illogical, therefore, to assume that
U.S. tactical air assets will be afforded the opportunity to
remove the SS threat through their destruction in-port. It
will require the assignment of U.S. naval ASW assets (surface,
subsurface, or air--or any combination of the three) to
remove these dangerous foxes from the Caribbean henhouse.
Those ASW assets will, in all likelihood, be needed elsewhere.
The crux of the issue is the fact that in a general war, U.S.
and NATO naval assets will be hard-pressed to meet all of
their operational requirements, especially in the ASW world.
In 1983, the United States Navy conducted large-scale
exercises in the Caribbean, involving two aircraft carrier
battle groups (CVBG) , the battleship New Jersey with escort,
and auxiliary vessels, for a total of 43 warships. These
combatants and support ships were stationed off Central
American shores. This force cut deeply into the U.S. Navy's
total of 204 major surface combat vessels, prompting John
Moore, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships , to comment that this
sort of Caribbean scenario stretched the U.S. Navy "desper-
ately tight.... The U.S. Navy simply does not have enough
ships; NATO does not have enough ships." [Ref. 57]
Combining Cuban FOXTROTS with Soviet SSN's and SSGN's,
all of which probably will be prepositioned before the start
of hostilities, the Kremlin provides U.S. and NATO forces
with yet another crushing ASW burden, and a further drain of
assets and energies from the next battle of the Atlantic.
Soviet deployment of some anti-SLOC submarines
closer to the U.S. shoreline would oblige the United
States to pull back its antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
forces from Europe and tie them down on the Eastern
Shore and in the Caribbean, giving the Soviets freer
rein in the European theater. [Ref. 58]
Likely, Cuban submarines will be skillfully operated, thus
providing ASW forces in pursuit frustrating and time-consuming
targets. There is little reason to suspect otherwise, as
these Cuban crews are Soviet-trained--a fact which the Soviets
cheerfully advertise: "Cuban seamen carefully study the oper-
ations of Soviet navymen in the Great Patriotic War, and
familiarize themselves with the present combat training of
our Navy, and are better and better equipped." [Ref. 59]
Soviet and Cuban naval forces train and practice together on a
regular basis. Since 1976, joint Soviet/Cuban naval maneuvers
have been held yearly [Ref. 60]
.
U.S. planners must ask the question: Can the United
States afford to entangle its precious ASW assets in hunting
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down Cuban diesel attack submarines in the Florida Straits
or the Windward Passage? Clearly the answer is a resounding
negative.
Yet another mission of the Cuban diesel submarine would
be the covert insertion of Cuban or Soviet naval infantry or
special warfare forces throughout the Basin, and possibly
including the southern United States. Utilizing its diesel-
electric submarines of far less capability, the German Navy
was able to accomplish the same mission, placing agents on
U.S. shores in the Second World War. The thousands of miles
of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico/U.S. shoreline would be
impossible to patrol adequately to prevent such actions from
taking place. The Panama Canal Zone, and U.S. military
facilities in Honduras also are likely targets for such
adventures
.
The offensive and defensive mine warfare capability of
the Cuban Navy has been increased considerably since 19 78
[Ref . 61] . The acquisition of ten plastic-hulled YEVGENYA-
class minesweepers
,
plus two SONYA-class minesweeper/mine-
hunters provides the Cubans with a viable counter to U.S.
attempts at quarantine of that island-nation through the
use of mines. These modern ships could sweep ahead for the
FOXTROTS attempting to ingress or egress from Cuban ports
,
and could perform a similar task for the Cuban Navy's dan-
gerous force of fast missile patrol craft.
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Cuba's missile craft are fast, modern, and working in
consort with Cuban MIG-2 3's and 21 's, form a dangerous anti-
SLOC force in the Caribbean. Here again, the contention is
not that these forces could stand head-to-head with the U.S.
and/or NATO forces, but that they will waste precious NATO
time and assets in the event of general war. The missile
craft become even more dangerous if working with the KONI-
class frigate, which can provide limited anti-air coverage
with its SAN-4 missiles and guns.
Finally, for those who remain skeptical of the threat
posed by the modern, skillfully operated diesel attack sub-
marines to a modern navy, the Falklands War serves as a
recent illustration. Two German-built Argentine mini-diesel
attack submarines (far less capable than the FOXTROT) success-
fully eluded Great Britain's Royal Navy with its state-of-the-
art ASW capability— for the entire conflict. The eventual
destruction of one of these ships took place only because
the submarine was caught in daylight, in port, by a British
airstrike
.
The second major strategic threat presented by the Cubans
is the potential for the Soviet Union launching a nuclear
strike from Cuba against the United States. This is no
more implausible than was the placing of offensive nuclear
weapons in Cuba in 1962. Recent Soviet declarations raise
the spector of the Missile Crisis revisited. In 1983, Soviet
Defense Minister Ustinov said that the U.S.S.R. will soon
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take steps that will graphically demonstrate the illusory
nature of U.S. calculations on its geographical isolation,
and the invulnerability of its own territory [Ref. 62].
The Soviets could use the Caribbean as a launching point
in a number of ways
:
--TU-26 Backfire Bombers could use at least three air-
strips in Cuba for refueling, recovery, and relaunch
for nuclear strikes. Figure 4 illustrates that the
refueled range areas for Backfire (and follow-on
strategic bomber, Blackjack) takes it to within range
of the Caribbean.
--TU-95 Bears, now on regular reconnaissance missions
up and down the U.S. Eastern Seaboard could be equipped
with nuclear weapons for a first-strike mission.
--In response to the U.S. /NATO deployment of Pershing-II
and GLCM in Europe, the Soviets could place SS-20's in
Cuba or Nicaragua. If placed surreptitiously, these
mobile weapons would be difficult for U.S. tactical
aircraft to locate and destroy in surgical strikes.
The highly accurate triple-warheaded SS-20, with a
range of 5,000 km, could provide the Soviets with a
quick and accurate nuclear surgical strike capability
against the continental United States.
If the Soviets were to place offensive nuclear weapons
in Central America, without being discovered, the United
States would not have the strategic superiority, nor the
tactical naval superiority it enjoyed in 1962 to coerce
the Soviet leaders into backing down from a flagrant act of
aggression.
C. THE CUBAN THREAT: REGIONAL
As mentioned earlier, the success of the revolution in
Nicaragua accelerated the revision of Soviet policy toward





Figure 4. Blackjack and Backfire Coverage from Soviet Bases
(two-way Missions).
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power
Second Edition, 1983, p. 25.
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Soviet Association of Friendship with Latin American countries,
Viktor Volski, called the armed victory in Nicaragua a "model"
to be followed in other countries; while Boris Ponomorev,
Chairman of the International Department of the Central
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, included the countries
of Central America, for the first time, among Third World
states undergoing revolutionary changes of a Socialist
orientation [Ref. 63].
Cuban and Soviet perceptions had merged once again. We
were treated to the spectacle of such dubious scholars as
El Salvador's PCES leader, Shafik Jorge Handel, writing in
prominent Soviet periodicals such as Kommunist (the theor-
etical organ of the Soviet Communist Party) that the Salva-
dorian revolution "will be victorious by the armed road. .
.
there is no other way." [Ref. 64]
The revitalized revolutionary strategy pursued in Nicaragua
has since found its way to El Salvador, Guatamala, and Honduras,
Splintered insurgent groups band together under pressure from
Havana. These artificial "broad coalitions" then come under
increased control of Cuban military direction, the principal
instrument for this direction being the Americas Department
of the Cuban Communist Party. Although revolutionary unrest
in all of these troubled Central American countries has its
indigenous causes, Cuba constitutes the principal external
cause of revolutionary violence and instability in the Basin
as it exploits new opportunities.
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The Cuban military's ground forces are as impressive in
number as its Air Force and Navy. Its total armed forces
stand at 153,000 troops, 190,000 reserves, 500,000 militia,
with approximately 2,400 Soviet military advisors in Cuba to
provide training and technical assistance, in addition to the
Soviet 3,000-man brigade. Cuba has a significant expeditionary
force which (as of 1983) was estimated to be about 40,000
troops [Ref . 65] . In a Rand Corporation study by Edward
Gonzales, we read:
Cuba's institutional outreach in support of
revolutionary movements and regimes in the Carib-
bean Basin has been further enhanced by the pro-
fessionalization of the FAR, and the creation of
the Special Troops Battalion in the Ministry of
Interior (MINIT) . The FAR has an estimated 2,000
military advisors in Nicaragua. .. as of 1983.* The
Special Troops Battalion within MINIT is under Fidel
Castro's personal command. It serves as an all-
purpose elite force capable of being dispatched
abroad in a crisis situation. .. .The Special Troops
Battalion could also be used to back a pro-Cuba
faction in an internal power struggle in a friendly
Basin country. [Ref. 66]
The logistics capability to move regular or special
forces has increased substantially since 1975. The Cuban
Air Force's logistics arm consists of IL-62 jet transports,
TU-154 medium range transports, and the versatile AN-26
short-medium range tactical transport, each capable of
carrying 40 fully-equipped airborne troops on a combat radius
*This number differs with earlier statistics of 3,000
Cuban advisors in Nicaragua. The number varies considerably
from source to source. [Author's note.]
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of 600 nautical miles. This places all of the Caribbean
within range of air-dropped troops, if Nicaraguan airfields
are utilized for refueling. The larger TU-154 and IL-6 2
can carry between 150 to 200 combat-equipped troops. In
1982, Cuba received two Soviet built POLNOCNY-class amphib-
ious assault ships, adding an interesting sealift assault
capability to the Cuban military.
The U.S. and East Caribbean Forces' intervention in
Grenada on 26 October 1983 provided the world with a col-
lection of documents which provide damning evidence of
Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the New Jewel Move-
ment (NJM) , far beyond any conceivable security need the
microstate of Grenada may have ever required for its own
defense
:
Another Soviet objective in the Caribbean Basin
is of a military and intelligence nature. Moscow
seeks to develop military ties with revolutionary
regimes in that region so as to accomplish what
Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolai
Ogarkov described in a 1983 conversation with his
Grenadian counterpart, Major Einstein Louison, as
"raising the combat readiness and preparedness" of
progressive forces facing a threat from imperialism.
Ogarkov specified the conditions favorable to this
goal: "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in
Latin America; today there are Nicaragua and Grenada,
and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."
[Ref. 67]
Documents show that even before formal arms agreements
were signed in Havana (October 1980) , the Soviets and Cubans
had shipped Grenada 1,000 automatic rifles, and Nicaragua
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had provided 2,000 uniforms [Ref. 68]. Classified arms
agreements between the Soviets and the NJM were signed in
1980, and Cuba acted as an intermediary for most deliveries
[Ref. 69] . Weapons and ammunition were sent almost exclu-
sively through Cuba, with Soviet seaborne deliveries made
to Cuban ports, and transferred to Cuban vessels for final
delivery to Grenada [Ref. 70] . A protocol to a 27 October
19 81 Grenada/U. S.S . R. agreement on arms deliveries (9 Febru-
ary 1981) provided for the delivery of eight armored personnel
carriers, two armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles, 1,000
submachineguns , ammunition, engineering, and communications
equipment [Ref. 71]. This agreement also called for the
delivery of 12,000 complete uniforms.
Yet another agreement between the U.S.S.R and NJM, signed
in Moscow on 27 July 1982, called for the delivery between
1982-85 of 50 armored personnel carriers, mortars, antitank
rocket launchers, antitank launchers, submachineguns, and
communications equipment [Ref. 72] . This same agreement
provided for the training of Grenadian military personnel
at Soviet military schools in the Soviet Union, as well as
Soviet advisors traveling to Grenada to provide local train-
ing and assistance. Grenadian officers were sent for mili-
tary training in the Soviet Union in 1982, and more were
projected to be sent in 1983.
In another classified "top secret" document discovered
by U.S. Forces, was an agreement between the NJM and its
67
patron for the delivery of 5.4 million rubles worth of "special
and other equipment" over the period 1983-1986. Included in
this agreement were to be deliveries of two patrol gunboats
,
an additional 3,000 uniforms, and 12,000 rounds of ammunition
[Ref. 73].
The captured documents also show official agreements
between Castro and the NJM. Cuba provided training scholar-
ships for Grenadian military personnel and Cuban military
advisors operating within the Grenadian Ministry of Defense
[Ref. 74]. The workforce constructing the Point Salines
runway and airport facility were primarily Cuban, with Soviet
assistance
.
The degree of involvement in Grenada by Communist nations
was as complex as it was widespread. Although not mentioned
often in the Grenada Documents, East Germany is considered by
U.S. intelligence analysts to have been "the most heavily
involved of the Soviet bloc countries." The documents showed
the East Germans involved in "party, trade union, and youth
organizations, and providing equipment for security forces."
[Ref. 75] The East Germans also aided in modernizing the
Grenadian telephone system, and provided training (in East
Germany) for Grenadians in farm machinery, radio, and tele-
communications equipment [Ref. 76]. The documents found on
Grenada also include arms agreements between the NJM and
North Korea, Bulgaria, and Vietnam.
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V. THE NICARAGUAN THREAT
Nicaragua has had a long and sad history of unrest and
oppression. The most recently deposed oppressors of the
Somoza dynasty "came to embody the essence of imperial power,
scheming, corruption, buying, selling, terrorizing, and
looting." [Ref. 77] Their violent overthrow seemed as inevi-
table as that of the countless other Latin American tyrants
who have dominated the political landscape in the last one
hundred years. Sadly, Somoza and his followers have been
replaced by a Leninist regime, no less odious in its violation
of human rights, its denial of civil liberties, and its appli-
cation of violence as the cure-all of its political ills.
What marks the Sandinista regime as infinitely more dangerous
than the Somoza dictatorship it deposed, not only to its
neighbors, but to the United States as well, is its campaign
to support leftist insurgency throughout the region. Coupled
with its geographic potential to become yet another Soviet
military haven in the Caribbean Basin, the Sandinista'
s
support of insurgencies (at the direction of Moscow and
Havana) creates a unique and critical national security
concern for the United States.
Although this work does not address in detail the char-
acter or makeup of the polities it discusses, in dealing with
Nicaragua, it would be remiss not to comment briefly on the
broken promises of the Commandantes . On 12 July 19 79, the
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Sandinista junta made solemn commitments to the Secretary
General of the Organization of American States (OAS)
,
pro-
mising to: establish full respect for human rights, to
enforce civil justice in Nicaragua, and to create free
elections [Ref. 78]. Signed by Commandante Daniel Ortega,
the document has proven to be the first, in a sadly long list,
of deceits by the ruling leftist elite.
In regard to human rights, the treatment of the Miskito
Indians in Nicaragua has come tragically close to crossing
the line into the dark world of genocide. Miskitos have been
forcibly relocated from traditional villages—those resisting
being killed by government forces [Ref. 79] . Senator Edward
Kennedy (hardly a friend of the current U.S. administration
or its policy in Central America) was compelled to write:
The Sandinista' s treatment of the Indians continues
to be unconscionable. One-third to one-half of the
90,000 Indians on the coast have been displaced. Some
20,000 have fled to Honduras to escape the Sandinista'
s
scorched-earth policy—the razing of villages along
the Rio Coco.... Most disturbing of all, 3,000 to 5,000
have lived for two years in intolerable conditions in
forced labor camps which resemble concentration camps.
[Ref. 80]
Civil rights appear to be no more a priority for the
Sandinistas than they were for Somoza. The recent elections
in Nicaragua were a sham; the opposition allowed only the
barest pretense of freedom to campaign against Ortega.
Arturo J. Cruz, a Nicaraguan revolutionary himself, and




The provisional junta, formed in exile, assured
the Organization of American States in writing that
it would guarantee its citizens universal suffrage.
However, as soon as the new government was installed
in Managua, the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista vanguard
began to concentrate power strictly in its own hands.
[Ref. 81]
Cruz goes on to quote the Sandinista Commandante in charge
of monitoring Nicaragua's electoral process, Bayardo Arce
,
as saying that elections were a "bothersome" response to
pressure from Washington, and that:
What a revolution needs is the power to enforce.
This power to enforce is precisely what constitutes
the defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat
—
the ability of the class to impose its will using
instruments at hand, without going into formal or
bourgeois details. [Ref. 82]
The evidence would indicate that the electoral process,
human rights, and civil liberties are just that to the
Sandinistas: "bourgeois details." The regime's brutal
treatment of the Miskito Indians, the creation of Cuban-
like watchdog "Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution" to spy and inform upon the citizenry, and
the harassment of the country's only independent news organ,
La Prensa , are all clear signposts indicating the aggres-
sively brutal nature of this newest Soviet client-state.
[Ref. 83]
A. THE NICARAGUAN THREAT: STRATEGIC
Nicaragua, like Cuba, poses a dual threat to the United
States. In a strategic sense, Nicaragua is well-placed in
the region to provide logistical support for Soviet air and
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naval assets operating in the Caribbean in peacetime. Nica-
ragua is unique in its ability to provide naval facilities on
both the Pacific and Atlantic shores. Therefore, the threat
potential of a hostile , Moscow-aligning Sandinista government
to U.S. strategic security is considerable, and very similar
to the Cuban threat:
Complicating matters , Soviet influence in Nica-
ragua raises the question of the potential military
utility of Nicaragua to the U.S.S.R. in interdiction
scenarios .... others fear that the Sandinistas 1 Soviet
orientation, together with the recent expansion of
airfields and upgrading of ports , add up to a greatly
enhanced Soviet ability to imperil U.S. security.
[ Re f . 8 4]
The runway under construction at Punta Huete, north of
Managua, is over 3,200 meters in length, and will accommodate
any Soviet-built fighter or attack aircraft. The airfield
includes dual runways and taxiways , as well as at least eight
military aircraft revetments [Ref. 85].
In the first days of November 1984, the world community
watched a minor replay of the Cuban Missile Crisis as the
United States announced its suspicion that Soviet-built
MIG-21 aircraft (aboard the Soviet freighter Bakuriani )
appeared to be destined for Corinto, in Nicaragua. U.S.
administration officials had strongly hinted in the past that
delivery of tactical jet aircraft to Nicaragua would be met
with "action" of some kind. The Bakuriani ' s cargo turned
out to be a false alarm, but not before a significant amount
of political opinion surfaced. Analyzing the mini-crisis,
shortly after the fact, Drew Middleton wrote:
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Reports that the MIG-21's would soon reinforce
the Nicaraguan Air Force excited American apprehension.
This was not because the MIG-21 is an advanced air-
craft... but because it is far superior to anything
in that country's inventory at present, or in the
inventories of any of Nicaragua's neighbors. "In
European warfare, forget the MIG-21," an Air Force
officer said recently, "but down there it would
dominate the air battlefield." [Ref. 86]
Middleton went on to report that of equal seriousness to
the potential MIG deliveries was the actual delivery of Soviet
frontline combat helicopters which "enhance the striking power
of Nicaragua's ground forces." [Ref. 87]
During the crisis, some of the most vocal critics of
Reagan administration policy in Central America suddenly
shifted gears on their position vis-a-vis Nicaragua. Senator
Christopher J. Dodd (Democrat of Connecticut) , and Senator
Jim Sasser (Democrat of Tennessee) did not rule out the use
of U.S. military force to deal with Soviet jet aircraft
delivered to Nicaragua [Ref. 88] . The administration compared
the MIG incident to the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba prior to
the Missile Crisis of 1962, and Michael Barett, Defense Depart-
ment spokesman, said that the accumulation of arms in Nicaragua
exceeded any defensive needs. "We just don't feel that
Nicaragua wants to be a peaceful neighbor." [Ref. 89]
If the Nicaraguans were to obtain tactical jet aircraft
such as the MIG-21 or MIG-23, or more likely, were to allow
Cuban Air Force assets to operate from Nicaraguan airfields,
they would be in a position to strike at Mexico, the southern
United States, and Panama. The Panama Canal remains an
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important factor in NATO war plans for access and rapid trans-
fer of amphibious forces and warships between Atlantic and
Pacific oceans, as well as for trade and movement of raw
materials
.
Joseph Cirincione and Leslie Hunter have examined this
potential threat Nicaragua poses as a support site for the
Soviet Navy [Ref . 90] . They see the advantage to the Soviet
Union of a Pacific port in Nicaragua in the context of the
numerous alternate shipping routes that may be employed by
the United States to avoid interdiction operations by Soviet
forces. Some of these routes, they assert, would pass by, or
near, the West Coast of Central America. As an example,
U.S. -bound oil tankers might head eastward from the Persian
Gulf to the U.S. West Coast to circumvent a possible Soviet
attack from submarines operating from support facilities
near East Africa. A Soviet facility in Western Nicaragua,
they argue, could expose them to attack as they neared their
destination. Alternately, a westward route from the Persian
Gulf, around the Cape of Good Hope, across the tip of, and
up the western reaches of, South America could render U.S.-
bound tankers even more vulnerable to Soviet SSN's and/or
SSGN's operating from Nicaraguan bases. Such a Nicaraguan
naval facility would seriously threaten U.S. or NATO shipping,
and serve as an augment to the Soviet Navy's already consider-
able operational flexibility in the region, presently provided
by Cuba.
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Referring to Admiral Harry D. Train, II, Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic, and his testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives [Ref . 91] , Cirincione and Hunter cite the
CinC's report, i.e., the Soviet Union may begin stationing
some of their DELTA-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines
in the South Atlantic
—
possibly in the ocean area between
Brazil and Africa. Some form of a forward deployment base
would be required, and according to the (then) Atlantic
Commander, it would likely be in West Africa, complete with
requisite support ships. This might include frontline Soviet
combatants. "If they do that," Train went on, "that forward
deployed fleet will be squarely astride these vital sealanes
through the South Atlantic ." [Ref. 92] Taken in light of
the already considerable Soviet naval presence in the Carib-
bean, operating from Cuba, can the United States tolerate
yet another basing facility to spring up on the East and
West Coasts of Nicaragua, futher contributing to this disturb-
ing Soviet naval synergy?
Nicaraguan airfields would add to the above effect by
providing the Soviets even greater strategic and maritime
reconnaissance capabilities against U.S. and NATO naval
forces in the Caribbean, as well as up and down the East and
West Coasts of the United States.
B. THE NICARAGUAN THREAT: REGIONAL
In less than five years, the Sandinistas have built the
largest and most modernly equipped military force in Central
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America. No other country in the region can even begin to
match the Nicaraguan military machine in firepower or mobility.
Table V compares the conventional military forces of Nicaragua,
Honduras, and El Salvador to illustrate this disequilibrium.
In 1984, deliveries of tanks and armored personnel carriers
(APC's) on Bulgarian ships have more than doubled the size
of Nicaragua's tanks and mechanized forces since May 1983.
[Ref. 93]
By contrast, Honduras has 16 approved reconnais-
sance vehicles. These are not amphibious and cannot
carry personnel other than crew members. Costa Rica
has no army, much less any tanks, and El Salvador,
while having a few dozen armored personnel carriers
does not have tanks. [Ref. 94]
Aside from offensive weaponry such as tanks and artillery,
Nicaragua has greatly increased its collection of logistical
support military vehicles:
During the first six months of 1984, the U.S.
Government noted the arrival in Nicaragua of over
200 military trucks, about 300 jeeps, plus smaller
numbers of other vehicles and spare parts. In 1983,
Nicaragua received nearly 500 trucks, over 500 jeeps,
and about 100 other vehicles. East Germany alone
has provided more than 1,000 trucks since 1980. The
Soviets have supplied at least six heavy ferries to
give additional amphibious mobility to the Nicaraguan
armed forces. With these ferries, the nonamphibious
tanks could be taken across rivers or other bodies of
water. [Ref. 95]
The 7,500 to 9,000 soldiers in Somoza's National Guard
have been replaced by a standing army of 61,800, with 12,000
reserves. This is twice the size of any other Central
American Army. In addition, there exists a 40,000 male and
female popular militia. [Ref. 96] Nicaragua has an offensive
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF CENTRAL AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES
Nicaragua Honduras El Salvador
Total 61,800 17,200 i41,650
under arms
Army (Armor 60 T54/T55 (MET) 16 Scorpion Lt Tks 12 AMX-13
and Artillery) 3 M-4A3 12 RBY MKI Recce ]Lt Tks
20 PT-76 Lt Tks 24 M-102, 105nm 18 AML-90
20 BRDM-2 30 120nrn Mort Armd car
20 Staghound armd M-116 75mm 10 M-113




30 M-1942 76mm guns 6--M-114 155mm
12 105mm 81mm mort
24 M-1938 122nm 8 UB-M52 122mm
12 D-30 How mort
12 D-20 How M-18 57mm




48 ZIS-2 57nm AA
Air Force 3 T-33A 12 Super Mystere B2 11 Ouragan
(Aircraft 3 T-28D 4 F-86E 18 Super Mystere B2
and anti- 6 SF-260 10 A-37B 7 Magister
air weapons) 4 C-47 10 C-47 17 A-37
1 Falcon 20 4 Cessna 6 0-2 Recce
10 MI-8 Helo 10 UH-1H Helo 5 C-47
2 OH-6A Helo (on loan) 2 DC-6
2 Alouette III
Helo














1 LCM 9 other patrol 3 other patrol
8-10 other patrol craft craft
Source: Compiled from data in: "Nicaragua's Military
Build-up and Support for Central American Subversion," Depart-
ment of State, Department of Defense, Washington, July 1984;
and The Military Balance: 1984-1985, IISS, London, 1984.
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capacity based on its arsenal of 60 Soviet-built T-54 and
T-55 tanks, 80 BTR armored personnel carriers, 105mm and
152mm howitzers, and MI-3 attack helicopters. The thin
guarantee of good intentions in regard to these offensive
weapons is not altogether convincing. As one Nicaraguan
military leader put it: "We are not a war machine. We have
tanks, possibly more than Honduras. But this is not the most
important thing. It doesn't mean we have bad intentions."
[Ref. 97]
Nicaragua's neighbors remain unconvinced, causing a
Central American arms race. Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala are making large arms purchases to counter the
Nicaraguan threat. Even Costa Rica, which has no army, is
expending funds to enlarge its security forces. There
already exists a de facto state of war between Nicaragua
and her neighbors in regard to borders. The handwriting
is on the wall, foretelling future Nicaraguan aggression
against its neighbors.
Honduras has claimed 33 border violations and
violent acts by the Sandinistas in the period from
January 30 to August 20, 1982. Honduran violators
are also cited by Nicaraguan leaders who talk about
"a real state of war" along the borders of Honduras....
Both sides have increased their military presence
along the borders. [Ref. 98]
By threatening other Central American neighbors, Nicaragua
fuels an arms race, creates instability, and diverts the time,
effort, energy, and most importantly, the economic means of
these countries from their pressing and critical domestic ills.
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The instability thus created places at risk U.S. efforts to
aid the region economically and maintain a secure American
backyard.
The Nicaraguan support for insurgency in Central America,
specifically and most importantly in El Salvador (but also in
Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica) is the most serious of
the present-day threats to U.S. security interests in the
Caribbean Basin. Arms shipments through Nicaragua to Salva-
doran guerrillas increased dramatically in June 1980 [Ref.
99]. The supply network between Nicaragua and El Salvador
follows a variety of routes, routinely using Honduran terri-
tory for land routes, as well as alternate sea and air conduits
Former El Salvadoran guerrilla leaders have testified that in
1981 and 1982, Salvadoran insurgents received nearly all
of their arms from Nicaragua. They received monthly ship-
ments via the overland route through Honduras , by truck
[Ref. 100]
.
By sea, vessels disguised as fishing boats leave from
Nicaragua's northwestern coast, and then transfer their arms
shipments to motorized canoes which enter the inlets and bays
of El Salvador. In September 1983, two Nicaraguan trans-
shipment points (La Concha in Estero de Padre Ramos , and
Potosi on the Gulf of Fonseca) were attacked by anti-Sandin-
ista forces. Western reporters who visited La Concha after
the attack found a radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility
disguised as a fishing cooperative. Local fishermen were
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reported to have seen wooden crates being unloaded from mili-
tary vehicles and placed into motor launches. The reporters
also noted that the site at La Concha was littered with empty
ammunition boxes. [Ref. 101]
Arms continue to be shipped to El Salvador from points in
Nicaragua across the Gulf de Fonseca. The Salvadoran and
Honduran Governments have had intermittant success in stem-
ming the flow of weapons into their respective countries from
Nicaragua. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense report:
A dramatic interdiction occurred in January 19 81,
when a refrigerated trailer-truck from Nicaragua,
passing through Honduras on its way to El Salvador,
was found to be carrying more than 100 M-16 rifles,
and thousands of rounds of ammunition, including
rocket and mortar shells, in its hollow roof. The
guerrillas are using a combination of automobiles,
small vans, trucks, mules, and people with backpacks
for transporting arms overland. A group of Salvadoran
guerrillas were caught by Honduran authorities in
March 19 8 3 with arms and a map tracing a route from
Nicaragua through Honduras to El Salvador. Also, the
Hondurans have succeeded in locating safehouses and
breaking up some groups , including Honduran and
Salvadoran guerrillas. [Ref. 102]
American reporters in Nicaragua in April 1984, interviewing
Western European and Latin American diplomats, were told
that the Sandinistas were continuing to send military equip-
ment to El Salvadoran guerrillas, and to operate training
camps for these guerrillas inside Nicaragua [Ref. 103]
.
In mid-1980, Salvadoran Communist Party Chairman Handel
led a guerrilla delegation which visited Cuba, the Soviet
Union, Vietnam, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ethiopia.
The purpose of the Handel delegation was to obtain arms for
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the Salvadoran insurgent movement, and in this aim, the group
was highly successful. Soviet officials helped to arrange
for shipment of arms, some of which were of U.S. origin,
captured in Vietnam. The route of these arms shipments was
through the Soviet Union's two Caribbean Basin client-states.
Weapons first arrived in Cuba for subsequent transfer to El
Salvador via the described transfer system originating in
Nicaragua. This U. S .S . R. /Cuba/Nicaragua transfer arrangement
has been in operation since the Sandinista takeover in 19 79
[Ref . 104] . In the words of a former Salvadoran guerrilla
leader: "the majority of arms was given by Vietnam--
American M-16's. The arms came from Vietnam to Havana;
Havana to Managua; Managua to El Salvador." [Ref. 10 5]
In a Washington Post article in 1983, the Nicaraguan
involvement in Honduras was described in detail. Honduran
officials had been alerted to the attempt at establishing
a guerrilla force in Honduras, originating from Nicaragua.
Honduran guerrilla defectors told of the plan to establish
this force, and also of their guerrilla training in Cuba
and Nicaragua. Their return to Honduras was via a safehouse
in Managua prior to their infiltration back over the Hon-
duran border. The defectors alleged that their group was
the advance team of a yet larger group to follow from Nica-
ragua, to be supplied via air-drops from Nicaragua. [Ref.
106] The incursion of these Nicaraguan-backed insurgents
has no doubt been a major motivation in the Honduran
1
Government's recent attempt to seek increased military aid
from the United States. On 29 November 19 84, Honduran offi-
cials met with Secretary of State George P. Schultz , Defense
Secretary Casper W. Weinberger, and other key U.S. adminis-
tration figures to discuss increased U.S. security assistance
to Honduras, as well as the establishment of a permanent U.S.
base there [Ref . 107]
.
Costa Rica, which had been pro-Sandinista in the early
stages of that regime's existence, is also threatened by
Nicaraguan-backed insurgency leading the Costa Rican Pres-
ident Luis Alberto Mongie to comment on the threat from
Nicaragua: "I never thought I would say, as I do now, that
we would have it worse in four years [of Sandinismo] than
in 40 years of Somoza." [Ref. 108] Since 1981, Costa Rica
has experienced sporadic terrorist acts including bombing
and kidnapping. Aside from violence directed against Costa
Rica, the Sandinistas have attempted to use Costa Rica as
the site of assassination attempts against their political
opponents. In June 1983, two Nicaraguan officials entered
Costa Rica to meet with Nicaraguan opposition leaders Eden
Pastora and Alfonso Robelo of the exiled Democratic Revolu-
tionary Alliance (ARDE) . The Nicaraguan officials, under
the guise of defectors, attempted to assassinate the ARDE
leaders by use of a bomb hidden in an attache case. The
plot and the assassins were foiled when the time-bomb explo-
ded prematurely, killing one Nicaraguan assassin and wounding
the others [Ref. 109]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Security problems and challenges for the United States,
created by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, illuminate
one fundamental fact: first and foremost, the problem is an
East-West issue. This most recent "battleground" happens to
be taking place in the Caribbean Basin, prompting many to
sieze upon the notion that the U.S. is enmeshed in a classic
North-South struggle. That is true only in a secondary sense.
The Soviet Union has sought to extend and export its influence
in the Western Hemisphere by taking advantage of the economic
strife and endemic political instability of the region, not
to mention a long held anti-American sentiment. They have
succeeded admirably in their goal. A militerized Cuba has
been a fait accompli for over two decades; the Sandinistas
have been following suit at a breakneck pace for the past
five years; and Grenada, with its New Jewel Movement, was
a showpiece expansion of Creole-Leninism.
The purpose of this paper has not been merely to catalog
the myriad threats (strategic and regional) posed by Cuba
and Nicaragua working in conjunction with the Soviets.
Rather, the information contained herein should serve as a
bedrock upon which to construct the critical question con-
cerning the events at work in this troubled region: Has
the time come for the United States to shun its self-
conciousness concerning the implementation of the Monroe
Doctrine? This study in no way argues for the abandonment
of significant and long-term economic aid for the Central
American and Caribbean states. This is a critical element
of the U.S. security structure in the region. [Ref. 110]
However, economic aid is not sufficient to the task of re-
establishing the Caribbean Basin as a sphere of unquestioned
U.S. security dominance. The Soviet Union has sought to
find holes in the Monroe Doctrine for decades , as was clearly
articulated in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs. The U.S. cannot
apply an effective economic program in the presence of radi-
calized Soviet clients. Nor can providing Caribbean states
with richly deserved economic assistance for human development
be accomplished while Soviet client-states actively foment
leftist insurgencies throughout the region.
Defense Secretary Weinberger, speaking on the NBC news
program "Meet the Press" on 11 November 1984, echoed the
Reagan administration's slow but sure ideological reembracing
of the Monroe Doctrine:
We shouldn't forget that the United States'
policy for many decades has been governed by the
Monroe Doctrine (and its emphasis) on the impor-
tance of noninterference by other hemispheres into
the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. [Ref. Ill]
The Weinberger statement is a result of the incontrovertable
evidence of Soviet-sponsored aggression in the Caribbean
Basin. Ironically, the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823,
was an effort to curb Russian moves to colonize the northwest
coast of North America, as well as to thwart other European
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powers from filling the void created by the departure of
Spanish influence in Latin America. President Monroe's view
on outside interference was unequivocal: "We should consider
any attempt on their [the Europeans J part to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety." [Ref. 112] Can anyone reasonably
argue that the Soviet-sponsored Nicaraguan and Cuban support
of insurgency in El Salvador (and other Central American
states outlined earlier in this work) is not a threat to
U.S. security? Can any reasonable argument be made that the
basing facilities provided by Cuba for Soviet naval and air
assets does not offer a serious threat to the Caribbean SLOC ' s
,
and therefore directly challenge U.S. security?
The reluctance in embracing the Monroe Doctrine stems
from the checkered history of U.S. military intervention in
the region: The Spanish American War (1898), Theodore
Roosevelt's securing the right to construct the Panama Canal
(1903) , establishment of a protectorate over Cuba (1903)
,
interventions in the Dominican Republic (1905, 1912, 1916-24,
1965-66), Nicaragua (1909, 1912-25, 1926-33), Haiti (1915-
34), and Mexico (1914, 1916). All are examples of U.S.
political-military policy which opponents to the Monroe
Doctrine list as a dark and shameful history, not to be
repeated. Military intervention is a last resort for policy-
makers—or should be. Yet, when does the threat to U.S.
security interests become intolerable? The threat of
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international communism led to a collective security instru-
ment, the Declaration of Caracas in 1954, and led President
Eisenhower (certainly no stranger to the horrors of modern
warfare) to intervene militarily against Arbenz in Guatemala
that same year. Those who completely dismiss military inter-
vention as a policy option have the misguided perception that
by refraining from such actions, the U.S. assures itself
lasting admiration in the court of world opinion. This is
a delusion. The United States accomplishes one thing, and
one thing only, when it tolerates aggression: it signals
to the aggressor--"proceed at will."
John Norton Moore, Professor of International Law at the
University of Virginia, is assisting the U.S. State Depart-
ment in its defense of the United States in the World Court
against the Nicaraguan lawsuit over CIA-sponsored mining
activities. Moore stated that it was "absolutely clear"
that the United States had a legal right to use military
force against Nicaragua. Moore said: "We have an ongoing
armed attack directed by Nicaragua against El Salvador."
This brings into play, he argued, the right of "collective
self-defense," recognized by the United Nation's Charter
and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of
1947 (known to many as the Rio Treaty) . He further stated
that the Monroe Doctrine was "very fundamental" to the dis-
pute, because it represented the United States' "dim view
of nations seeking to impose by force of arms, their kinds
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of political systems on nations in this hemisphere."
[Ref. 113]
Cuba was a major setback for maintaining U.S. security
in the region, and with the exception of the action in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, the Monroe Doctrine has been a
dormant policy. Dormant, that is, until October 1983, when
the U.S. and East Caribbean Forces intervened in Grenada.
Grenada, and its Leninist New Jewel Movement, was important
to the Soviets for a variety of reasons. So, too, was its
loss. Dov Zakheim, Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and Resources, argues:
Grenada was thus a useful asset to the Soviet
Union, and consequently its loss must have been
viewed by Soviet policymakers as a blow to efforts
aimed at the expansion of its foothold in the Western
Hemisphere. The invasion also resulted in several
blows to the "progressive forces" of the region.
Most noticeable in this regard were the expulsion of
Cuban advisors from Suriname , and Castro's admission
of his inability to come to the aid of revolutionary
regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. [Ref. 114]
Has the United States recovered from its "Vietnam
Syndrome" as both Soviet and U.S. political analysts insist?
The answer lies in the future policy of the United States
in the Caribbean Basin. The threat is serious; the need
to demonstrate to the Soviets a firm resolve in dealing
with that threat is paramount.
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